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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/07/2011

Accident number: 749

Accident time: 09:05

Accident Date: 10/06/2010

Where it occurred: AF/2306/31829,
MF0040, Barakzai
village, Naw Zad
district, Helmand
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: 05/07/2010

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
CBDT
Mine/device: IED

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 11/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
Two reports of this accident that have been made available by UNMACCA are reproduced
below, edited for anonymity. The first is the Board of Inquiry, the second is the Lessons
Learned from that inquiry. Their conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original
formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial.

BOARD OF INQUIRY ABOUT FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT of [the Victim] THE
DEMINER OF [Demining group] CBDT-05
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INTRODUCTION
Dr [Name removed], Programme Director for the Mine Action Coordination Centre of
Afghanistan (MACCA) convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to investigate the
circumstances involved in the demining accident causing the death of [the Victim] a deminer
from [Demining group]’s Community Based Demining Team (CBDT-05).
The BOI comprised the following personnel:
Dr. [Name removed] Chief of QM MACCA: Chairman
[Name removed] from [Demining group]: member
[Name removed] [2nd Demining group] Project Manager in Naw Zad: Member
[Name removed] [2nd Demining group] OPS Assistant in Naw Zad: Member
[Demining group] Representative ([Name removed]): Observer
A copy of the appointment of personnel to carry out the formal investigation including the BOI
Terms of Reference is at Annex A to this report.
GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER
Helmand province locates in South-Western part of Afghanistan; it is relatively hot in the
summer season. The accident site (AF/2306/31829/MF0040) is an abandoned IED field
located in Barakzai village, Naw Zad district of Helmand province. The terrain of the area is
flat with some housing.
Priority of Task
AIF (Abandoned IED Field) number 0040 along with other surrounding areas within Naw Zad
district are heavily contaminated by abandoned IEDs. The residential areas, agricultural
lands, irrigation systems and orchards were mainly contaminated during the conflict time
between Taliban and Coalition forces. After the Taliban insurgents left the area in 2009, the
local residents returned to their villages in Naw Zad district. Because of the heavy
contamination within the area with IEDs several accidents have occurred. The orchards, the
agricultural lands, irrigation systems and the houses have been blocked by IEDs. Therefore,
the area was counted as high priority to be cleared as soon as possible to prevent further
local accidents.
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
It was the first day of operations in AIF 0040, the site layout and marking being employed till
the accident time, is in place. The team was busy establishing admin area, base lane and
control marking, the team members were briefed by team leader about the scope and extent
of hazards and the safe areas around AIF 0040.
MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE
Although the team members had been briefed about the location and extent of contamination
in the area, the deminer [the Victim] entered to hazardous area and ignored the information
provided by the team leader. 10th of June was the first day of operations in task 0040 and the
team members were busy in establishing control marks, admin, parking areas and creating
base lane for further clearance. The team has also started clearance of some lanes and the
deminer [the Victim] was tasked to follow the marking of already cleared area. But because of
break time he left the area and entered into the task seeking a shadow to take break there.
According to the team structure, the command group consists of one team leader and a
deputy team leader, no section leader is available.
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Therefore, the poor supervision was the main contributing factor to this fatal accident. The
deminer was not stopped from going into the task by either another deminer or the command
group while he was entering to contaminated area. As Naw Zad project is a community based
demining project and all the deminers are hired from the community i.e. they are not
experienced deminers, therefore, strong and extra numbers of command element should had
been assigned to supervise such teams.
In general there was lack of command and control in the team and this caused the accident.
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL
The team was visited by external QA on 23rd of May 10; the result was a conformity report.
External QA is being conducted by [2nd Demining group] as representative of MACCA in Naw
Zad project.
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING
In general there is communication problem in Naw Zad district, as it is recently released by
one side of conflict faction. The communication within the team was maintained. But the team
informed investigators around 1 hour after the accident happened.
MEDICAL REPORTS
The paramedic reached the accident site in 10 minutes, but due to the severity of injuries the
victim passed away on the spot.
WITNESS INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS
The team leader, deputy team leader and the paramedic of the team were interviewed by the
BOI team. The statements are attached at Annex C to this report. [Not made available.]
DETAILS OF THE MINE INVOLVED
The main problem in Naw Zad is the IED contamination; abandoned IED fields are the main
target for clearance. So the item caused this fatal accident was an IED planted in the
entrance of a mosque.
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING
The BOI found no evidence of re-mining of the clearance site and this therefore did not
contribute to the accident.
EVIDENCE OF SITE INTERFERENCE OR TAMPERING AFTER THE ACCIDENT
Actually the accident occurred inside the task, where no operations had been conducted.
Only a lane was cleared to evacuate the casualty after the accident happened. The site was
not tampered after the accident.
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
The deminer was issued a standard issue ROFI protective jacket and a Helmet complete with
visor. This PPE comes in two parts with the lower part (apron) fixed to the upper (jacket) by
way of plastic clips. But in such accidents the PPE is not effective as the deminer stepped on
an IED consisting several kg of explosives.
USE OF MINE DETECTION DOGS (MDD)
The MDDs were not used in this AIF, as it was a community based demining team.
USE OF Mechanical MACHINES (MDU)
The MDU was not used in this site.
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DATE OF LAST REVISION COURSE FOR TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT
The basic demining course was started from March 10 and completed in April 2010 to all
[Demining group] CBDTs in Naw Zad project. A staff member from [Demining group] training
cell is assigned as teacher to the community based teams of Naw Zad to provide continuous
training to their teams there.
DETAILS OF MEDICAL EVACUATION AND TREATMENT
The deminer was killed in the spot.
PARTICULARS OF DEMINERS INSURANCE
The victim was covered for death and trauma insurance under a standard policy held by all
Implementing Partners in Afghanistan with the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan.
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT
The team started work on site in the morning and everyone received briefing from the team
leader. It was the first day of operations in this specific AIF 0040; they started to establish
control marking, admin and parking area. Some of the deminers were tasked to start
clearance operations in base lane and create cross lanes. The deceased deminer [the Victim]
was tasked to conduct marking in already cleared lanes.
On 09:05 during the break time [the Victim] entered into the hazard area in order to proceed
to a mosque located inside the AIF to get his break there. Unfortunately one metre away from
the gate of mosque he stepped on an IED and caused it to detonate which resulted in a fatal
accident. According to the statements of team leader and deputy team leader, they were
busy with measuring Turning Points and tasking of the deminers in their clearance lane. After
5 minutes the deputy team leader and paramedic arrived to the site, cleared a lane towards
the accident point to evacuate the casualty. But the deminer had died on the spot.
TECHNICAL POINTS CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT
The accident happened during the break time in a portion of task which was located inside the
AIF and has not been processed yet. However the deminers were briefed about the extent of
hazard, but [the Victim] the deminer of CBDT-05 was trying to get to the mosque located
inside the task.
There are two technical misses contributed in this fatal accident:
•

The deminer was un-experienced person as he was recently hired from the
community.

•

Lack of proper command and control in the team i.e. lack of section leader and poor
supervision of team leader and deputy team leader.

SUMMARY
It is the view of the BOI team that the deminer entered to contaminated area, he was not
stopped by command group. The deputy team leader and team leader failed to stop the
deminer from entering to un-cleared area.
CONCLUSION
It is the BOI conclusion that the deminer, [the Victim] made the mistake in terms of entering to
un-cleared area and lack of command and control contributed to this accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE
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The BOI recommend the following points to be considered widely by all organizations and by
[Demining group] especially:
The command, control and supervision shall be strengthened, specific trainings should be
held to the command groups of the teams.
Under no circumstances the deminers and other team members are allowed to enter the
hazard area, unless an access lane is cleared to proceed through.
[Demining group] Office is to organize a comprehensive training and clearly explain the safety
procedures during the operations, if there is any points with [Demining group] operations, they
can come to MACCA operations department to discuss the issue.
[Demining group] should increase the command group to three people, there should be one
section leader per each section and team leader should be supervising entire team. Current
structure of command group i.e. a team leader and his deputy are not sufficient especially in
community based demining projects, as all the team members are hired from the community
without having enough experience of demining operations.
The internal QA shall be more active and professionalized to get the weak points and
recommend remedial actions on time.
The level of supervision should be strengthened in all teams, the [Demining group] should
take necessary steps and come up with a practical plan of action and present it to MACCA
Programme Director by no later than the 20th of July 2010.
[2nd Demining group] project office for Naw Zad should be more proactive for releasing
professional advice to the teams especially about the safety and standard working
procedures.
Signed: Dr. [Name removed], BOI Chairman
ANNEXES: [Not made available]
Annex A: BOI - Terms of Reference
Annex B: Site Map
Annex C: Accident Site Photos
Annex D: Witness Interviews and Statements

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION
Dr [Name removed], Director for the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan
(MACCA) convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to investigate the circumstances involved
in the demining accident causing the death of [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group]’s
Community Based Demining Team (CBDT-05). The investigation had been conducted by
[2nd Demining group] Naw Zad project office, but the information had been compiled by
MACCA QM section.
SUMMARY
AIF (Abandoned IED Field) number 0040 is one of the heavily AIED contaminated areas
within Naw Zad district. The residential areas, agricultural lands, irrigation systems and
orchards were mainly contaminated during the conflict time between Taliban and Coalition
forces. After the Taliban insurgents left the area in 2009, the local residents returned to their
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villages in Naw Zad district. Because of the heavy contamination within the area, several
accidents occurred there. The orchards, the agricultural lands, irrigation systems and the
houses have been blocked by AIEDs.
On 10 of June 2010 the first day of operation in task 0040, all the team members had been
briefed by team leader about the location and extent of contamination in the area. The
deminers were tasked to establish admin, parking areas, control marking and create the
baseline. The team members also started clearance operations in some lanes and the
deminer [the Victim] was tasked to follow the marking of already cleared lanes. But because
of the break time he left the area and entered into the task seeking a shadow to take break
there. He wanted to enter to a mosque located inside the hazard area, on the way to the
mosque he stepped on an IED, caused it to go off, so the fatal accident occurred and
Rahmatullah died in the spot.
CONCLUSION
It is the BOI conclusion that the deminer, [the Victim] made the mistake in terms of entering to
un-cleared area and lack of command and control contributed to this accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The BOI recommend the following points to be considered widely by all organizations and by
[Demining group] especially:
•

The command, control and supervision shall be strengthened, specific trainings
should be held to the command groups of the teams.

•

Under no circumstances the deminers and other team members are allowed to enter
the hazard area, unless an access lane is cleared to proceed through.

•

[Demining group] Office is to organize a comprehensive training and clearly explain
the safety procedures during the operations, if there is any points with [Demining
group] operations, they can come to MACCA operations department to discuss the
issue.

•

[Demining group] should increase the command group to three people, there should
be one section leader per each section and team leader should be supervising entire
team. Current structure of command group i.e. a team leader and his deputy are not
sufficient especially in community based demining projects, as all the team members
are hired from the community without having enough experience of demining
operations.

•

The internal QA shall be more active and professionalized to get the weak points and
recommend remedial actions on time.

The level of supervision should be strengthened in all teams, the [Demining group] should
take necessary steps and come up with a practical plan of action and present it to MACCA
Programme Director by no later than the 20th of July 2010.
[2nd Demining group] project office for Naw Zad should be more proactive for releasing
professional advice to the teams especially about the safety and standard working
procedures.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 940

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Not recorded

Long visor

Summary of injuries: FATAL
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. Major blast injuries.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
inexperienced deminer was allowed to enter the unsafe area during a break time. There is an
inconsistency in the report because, although this was a break, the supervisors were
apparently busy with marking. The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because
the Victim appears to have been unaware of the risk he was running. Lack of training and
supervision were both highlighted as causes, and both represent a significant Management
Control Inadequacy.
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